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SUBJECT: USNATO AMBASSADOR DAALDER'S MEETINGS AT THE
CHANCELLERY AND MFA DURING JULY 1 VISIT TO BERLIN

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

11. (C/NF) SUMMARY. On July 1 in Berlin, USNATO Ambassador Daalder had wide-ranging meetings with Chancellery National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and MFA Political Director Volker Stanzel. Heusgen asked for help in getting the memo between SHAPE and CSTC-A that would enable Germany to follow through on its 50 million Euro pledge to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. Heusgen said that after the German federal elections in September, Merkel would conduct a major review of Germany's Afghanistan policy that would lead to a re-visiting of some existing strictures on German policy. On the NATO Strategic Concept, both Heusgen and Stanzel thought it was inevitable that the experts group would insist on producing some kind of written report, but agreed that it was important for capitals not to lose control over the drafting process. Heusgen complained bitterly about Turkey's "extortion" in demanding a NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASG) position in return for agreeing to Rasmussen as the new Secretary General. In response to Daalder's suggestion of new NATO accession process, Stanzel surprisingly expressed willingness to eliminate MAP entirely as a separate requirement and to rely solely on using bilateral commissions to assist aspirants. Reflecting the long-standing divide between the Chancellery and MFA over Russia, Stanzel highlighted what he perceived as a positive evolution of FM Lavrov's attitude from Trieste to Corfu, while Heusgen volunteered that he thought the Medvedev European security proposal was "the most idiotic proposal ever made." Heusgen also reported on a request from Belarus for help in resisting Russian pressure to recognize South Ossetia and Georgia, and offered German assistance in resolving the Macedonian name issue. END SUMMARY.

ANA TRUST FUND

12. (C/NF) The very first issue Heusgen raised was the German contribution of 50 million Euros to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. He noted that, as discussed during Chancellor Merkel's recent visit to Washington, Germany needed the promised memorandum of understanding (MOU), which lays out how the fund will work, before it could follow through on its pledge. Without this documentation, Heusgen explained, the government would not be able to earmark the 50 million Euros and there was a risk that the money would be moved back into the general fund. Daalder expressed understanding for the German predicament and said he would help get this done as soon as possible. (Comment: Our understanding is that a draft of the required MOU between NATO SHAPE and the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command is currently under review in DOD. End Comment.)

GERMAN ELECTORAL POLITICS AND AFGHANISTAN

13. (C/NF) Heusgen thought the next German government was likely to undertake a review of its Afghanistan policy similar to what the Obama Administration had done. He hoped the review would resolve some current strictures on German policy, yet provided no details. If, as expected, a coalition between the Chancellor's Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democrats (FDP) emerged after the September election, Heusgen voiced concern that FM Steinmeier's Social Democrats (SPD), as an opposition party, were likely to become much more negative on Afghanistan. As a result, it was important that the new government be able to offer clear prospects for success. He claimed that the lesson of the successful German deployment to Congo on an ESDP mission in 2006 was that such missions had to be limited in scope and have clear time horizons. He agreed with Daalder that it was critical to show visible progress within the next 12 to 18 months.

14. (C/NF) Pressed by Daalder to do more after the election, Heusgen emphasized that Germany would continue to focus its efforts in the north. When Daalder specifically asked whether Germany could envisage becoming more active in the west, Heusgen noted somewhat defensively that the Bundeswehr was already active in the RC-West district of Ghormach (which has been temporarily transferred to RC-North responsibility). While he allowed that Germany might be able to do more in this regard, he said flatly that if such an idea were discussed publicly now, "then it's dead." Reflecting the Chancellor's emphasis on the "comprehensive approach" in

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Afghanistan, Heusgen suggested that when laying out categories of needs in Afghanistan (troops, police, money to sustain the Afghan National Security forces, civilian experts and economic assistance), U.S. officials put troops at the bottom of the list rather than at the top.

DRAFTING THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

15. (C/NF) Heusgen argued that the new NATO Strategic Concept should be short (no more than 20 pages) and accessible to the general population. While it had to acknowledge the enduring importance of Article 5, it also had to demonstrate that NATO had moved beyond old Cold War thinking and was now oriented against new threats like piracy and energy security. NATO-EU cooperation had to be in the paper, but the big question mark was how to bring Turkey around (implying that this would be a U.S. task). He thought it would be a "disaster" if the document were drafted by a NATO committee, which is why he favored having this done by a much smaller group under Rasmussen's direct control and only presenting it to the NAC for review and approval about four weeks before the 2010 NATO Summit. He said that this was the approach successfully followed in developing the EU Security Strategy when he worked on EU High Rep Solana's staff.

16. (C/NF) Daalder said that the U.S. shared basically the same vision for what the new Strategic Concept should look like. However, in terms of process, he warned against trying to impose a product drafted by the Quad or a similarly exclusive group on the Alliance as a whole. Getting Allies, buy-in would be a delicate task. Both Heusgen and Stanzel agreed that Rasmussen's idea of holding an informal NATO summit in the spring of 2010, halfway through the Strategic Concept process, was inadvisable. Daalder suggested that another possibility was to hold a joint Foreign and Defense Ministers meeting instead. Both thought this was a good idea.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT EXPERTS GROUP

17. (C/NF) Heusgen openly admitted that he had favored the nomination of retired General Klaus Naumann, former Bundeswehr Inspector General and NATO Military Committee

Chairman, as the proposed German member of the Secretary General's Strategic Concept experts group. However, in the end, the SPD-controlled MFA had insisted on former German NATO PermRep and Ambassador to Russia and the UK Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz. Heusgen said von Ploetz would travel around Germany to help explain NATO and sell the new Strategic Concept to the German public. Daalder said another focus of the expert group ought to be reaching out to audiences outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly in Russia and Muslim countries. Both Heusgen and Stanzel found this plan intriguing, admitting that they had never considered that possibility.

18. (C/NF) Daalder questioned having the experts group produce any written report, which could then box-in national governments and limit their freedom in drafting the Strategic Concept. He noted that Madeleine Albright would serve Rasmussen in a personal capacity and would not be an official USG expert. This would have the advantage of allowing her to speak freely and to say things she might not be able to say otherwise. Both Heusgen and Stanzel countered that the experts would probably insist on producing something at the end of their work, but agreed that it was important to ensure that capitals not to lose control over the drafting process. Stanzel suggested that the Secretary General might issue a Chairman's Report reflecting the work of the experts group.

BITTER ABOUT TURKISH BEHAVIOR

19. (C/NF) Heusgen complained bitterly about what he called Turkey's "extortion" in demanding a NATO Assistant Secretary General (ASG) position in return for agreeing to Rasmussen as the new Secretary General. He also said that the Turks had "put on a big show" in claiming that Rasmussen was unacceptable to the Muslim world, when, in fact, no one had taken notice or raised any objections when the appointment was actually made. Heusgen said the German understanding was that the new Turkish ASG was supposed to be limited to doing public outreach to the Muslim world, but in fact, Rasmussen was considering a broader mandate, which infringed on the

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portfolio of German ASG for Political Affairs.

110. (C/NF) Stanzel noted that the Turkish media was reporting that the U.S. made the deal that secured Turkish agreement to Rasmussen. He wondered how the U.S. planned to resolve this issue. Daalder emphasized that Rasmussen was the one who had made the promise to the Turks and it was up to him to find a solution. While the U.S. was willing to help, we did not have the primary responsibility. Daalder noted, however, that the whole issue could soon be moot if NATO moved, as it seemed it might under the new Secretary General, to a system of open competition for NATO positions, in which ASG slots would no longer be reserved to specific countries. Heusgen seemed taken aback by the notion of Germany losing its designated ASG.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

111. (C/NF) Daalder suggested to both Heusgen and Stanzel that NATO explore changes in the accession process, since the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit had essentially turned the previous one on its head by denying Ukraine and Georgia the Membership Action Plan (MAP), while at the same time guaranteeing them eventual membership. He noted that the Alliance would soon have to decide on how to handle the recent application from Montenegro. Should a bilateral NATO commission be established to assist Montenegro with its NATO membership preparations (as was done in the case of Ukraine and Georgia) or should the Alliance continue the MAP process? He suggested that Germany and the U.S. plus a country from eastern Europe (perhaps Poland) should work together on developing a proposal for the way ahead.

¶12. (C/NF) Heusgen did not offer a substantive reply, but Stanzel surprisingly remarked that he thought bilateral commissions had already replaced MAP as the mechanism to assist aspirant countries in making the reforms necessary for membership. MFA Deputy NATO Office Director Gunnar Denecke stated the long-standing German position that eliminating MAP (and having just the commissions) could be viewed as trying to short-circuit the enlargement process and allowing premature accession. Stanzel, however, seemed prepared to contemplate a new enlargement process based entirely on bilateral commissions, without the additional hurdle of MAP.

DIFFERING VIEWS OF RUSSIA

¶13. (C/NF) In reviewing the OSCE foreign policy discussion in Corfu, Heusgen called the Medvedev proposal for a new European security architecture "the most idiotic proposal ever made." He said he had inadvertently laughed aloud when he read the section calling for the respect of territorial integrity. This had not been long after the war in Georgia and the Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Heusgen was also very dismissive of Medvedev's more recent idea of inviting five security organizations together (OSCE, NATO, EU, CIS, CSTO) as part of the dialogue on the Russian proposal. When Daalder noted that his German counterpart at NATO had been more open to the idea, Heusgen admitted that he had read the German reporting cable about the proposal "with disbelief."

¶14. (C/NF) Stanzel, on the other hand, generally expressed optimism about relations with Russia, noting that there had been a positive evolution in FM Lavrov's attitude between the G8 meeting in Trieste and the OSCE ministerial in Corfu. Stanzel said establishing trust with Russia was "extremely complicated," but called it essential. He praised the U.S. for its initiative in pursuing negotiations with Moscow on a START successor agreement as the perfect way to begin the substantive agenda.

SUPPORTING BELARUS

¶15. (C/NF) Heusgen noted that Belarus Head of Presidential Administration Makey had recently asked for German support in resisting Russian pressure to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Makey said that while Belarus wanted to maintain good relations with Russia, it did not want to be dominated by Russia. In a Solomonian attempt to satisfy both Russia and the West, Makey floated the idea of recognizing Kosovo at the same time as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but Heusgen said he had "strongly discouraged this."

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MACEDONIA

¶16. (C/NF) Heusgen said Macedonia should be admitted soon to the Alliance. Daalder agreed that we should redouble our efforts to help resolve the name issue. Heusgen offered to help, noting that Germany had strong ties to both countries and would be glad to be more involved. He urged that Washington let him know what Germany could do.
Koenig